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VIDEOTAPING FOR CLASSROOM USE:
FAIR OR FOUL?
The accelerated pace of technological development has spawned ma-
jor adaptations in traditional copyright law.' The proliferation of de-
vices that facilitate the reproduction of copyrighted materials taxes the
elasticity of copyright laws originally enacted to protect authors'2 rights
in printed works.' Even the most prescient draftsman of the 1909
Copyright Act could not have anticipated modem developments in
communications technology. In 1976 Congress, in recognition of the
contemporary problems confronting copyright law, implemented statu-
tory revisions to accommodate twentieth century technological ad-
vances.4 Nevertheless, the resulting legislation, though salutary in
numerous respects,' has proven incapable of resolving many of the
1. The first copyright statute was enacted in 1790, Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124
(1790). There have been four subsequent revisions: Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (1831);
Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (1870); Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320,35 Stat. 1075 (1909);
and, Act of Oct. 19, 1976, 90 Stat. 2541 (1977). The present copyright laws are codified at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
In its report on the 1976 Copyright Revision Act, the House Committee acknowledged that
changing technological conditions required revision of former copyright laws:
During the past half century a wide range of new techniques for capturing and commu-
nicating printed matter, visual images, and recorded sounds have come into use, and the
increasing use of information storage and retrieval devices, communications satellites,
and laser technology promises even greater changes in the near future. The technical
advances have generated new industries and new methods for the reproduction and dis-
semination of copyrighted works, and the business relations between authors and users
have evolved new patterns.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 65 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5659, 5660 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT 1476].
2. The term "author" derives from the language of article 1, section 8 of the Constitution,
which gives Congress the power "to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing
for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their writings and discoveries."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. In terms of copyright law "author" is construed in a constitutional,
rather than literal, sense. The Supreme Court in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111
U.S. 53, 58 (1884), defined "author" as "he to whom anything owes its origin; originator, maker
... In this Note, "author" refers to anyone who has created a work in the broader, constitu-
tional sense.
3. The first copyright act covered only maps, charts, and books. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15,
1 Stat. 124 (1790).
4. The 1976 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), was the product of
16 years of debate and discussion. The House Report outlines the steps toward revision. See
HOUSE REPORT 1476, supra note 1, at 47-50, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at
5660-63.
5. Many of the changes in the 1976 Copyright Act were designed to address issues raised by
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problems arising from the development of new technologies 6-
problems that tend to aggravate the tension between copyright owners7
and subsequent users' of copyrighted works.' As a result, courts have
been called upon to adapt the copyright statutes by interpretation to
conditions arising from technological innovations.' 0 Courts have de-
veloped various tests to determine whether unauthorized uses of copy-
righted works violate the copyright laws." One test courts frequently
rapidly changing technology. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1976) (allowing libraries or archives to
photocopy copyrighted works under certain conditions); id § 110(1) (allowing the performance of
audiovisual works in the course of face-to-face teaching activities of a nonprofit educational insti-
tution under specified conditions); id § 111 (d) (establishing compulsory licensing system for cable
television).
6. Many commentators argue that the statutory language of the 1976 Copyright Act is am-
biguous and unclear in offering guidelines for dealing with modem duplicating devices. L. SELT-
ZER, EXEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT 19 (1978); Bryer, The Uneasy Case/or Copyright.-
A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 316-
17 (1970); Ringer, The UnfinishedBusiness of Copyright Revision, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 951, 953-55
(1977).
Although Congress anticipated that problems would arise from the use of copyrighted works in
computer systems, see H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. 6 (1967), the present act does not
provide many solutions. See Impact of Information Technology on Copyright Law in the Use of
Computerized Scient/fc and Technological Information Systems, TECHNOLOGY AND COPYRIGHT
(Bush and Dreyfus, eds. 1979). Some guidance, however, is offered concerning reproduction of
computer programs for limited purposes. See 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
7. "'Copyright Owner,' with respect to any one of the exclusive rights comprised in a copy-
right, refers to the owner of that particular right." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
8. The Copyright Act does not give the copyright owner control over all uses of his work.
Section 106 enumerates five uses over which the copyright owner has exclusive control: (1) repro-
duction, (2) preparation of derivative works, (3) distribution, (4) performance, and (5) display. 17
U.S.C. § 106 (1976). In this Note, the term "use" will be used to refer to the appropriation of the
author's work by another for one of the purposes listed above, and "user" refers to the appropria-
tor. This Note is concerned primarily with the reproduction of copyrighted works. See infra note
34.
9. See infra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
10. The Sixth Circuit, in Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American Auto. Accessories Co., 5 F.2d
411, 411 (1925), observed that "[w]hile statutes should not be stretched to apply to new situations
not fairly within their scope, they should not be so narrowly construed as to permit their evasion
because of changing habits due to new inventions and discoveries." Id Since then, the Supreme
Court has ably responded to this challenge. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken,
422 U.S. 151 (1975) (copyright law applied to radio performances of copyrighted songs); Tele-
prompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974) (copyright law applied to
the broadcast of copyrighted material on cable television); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists
Television, 392 U.S. 390 (1968) (Court stated that it must read 1909 copyright statute in light of
technological change).
11. The copyright laws only protect the copyright holder against unauthorized copying. See,
e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954). Thus, there would be no copyright infringement if
an author were independently to produce a work identical to a prior copyrighted work. See, e.g.,
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669
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use is whether the allegedly infringing use 12 is a "fair use" of the copy-
righted work.'
3
Under a fair use rubric, certain unauthorized uses of a copyrighted
work do not violate the copyright laws because the user's interest in
copying the work outweighs the owner's interest in controlling access to
it. 4 Historically, courts have applied the fair use doctrine on a case by
case basis to accommodate rapidly changing conditions in copyright
law.'5 Recent innovations in videotechnology, however, raise issues
which arguably transcend the boundaries of traditional fair use.' 6
The videotaping 7 of copyrighted television programs for educa-
tional purposes is one use of copyrighted materials that tests the param-
(1936) Similarly, the mere unauthorized use of a copyrighted work does not constitute copyright
infringement. See, e.g., Produce Reporter Co. v. Fruit Produce Rating Agency, I F.2d 58, 61
(1924).
12. Generally, the test for copyright infringement is whether the defendant's reproduction is
"substantially similar" to the plaintiffs original. See 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHI
§ 13-01 to -3 (1982). The test is whether the copy is so similar to the plaintiffs work that an
ordinary reasonable person would conclude that the defendant unlawfully appropriated the plain-
tiff's expression by taking material of substance and value. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods..
Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977).
"Expression" is emphasized above to note that the protection granted to a copyrightable work
extends only to the particular expression of an idea, and not to the idea itself. Reyher v. Chil-
dren's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976). The
present copyright act codifies the idea/expression distinction. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976 & Supp. V
1981), Therefore. "if the only similarity between plaintiffs and defendant's work is that of the
abstract idea, there is an absence of substantial similarity, and no infringement results." M. NiM-
MER, supra, at 13-19. For further discussion of the idea/expression dichotomy, especially in terms
of first amendment defenses to copyright infringement, see infra note 66.
13 As a test. "fair use" differs from "substantial similarity." The latter is a threshold test for
determining whether there has been a copyright infringement. "Fair use," an affirmative defense
to copyright infringement, considers the question of whether an otherwise infringing activity
should be excused. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 50 & 55-66 and accompanying text.
15. See House Report 1476, supra note 1, at 5680. See infra notes 129-33 and accompanying
text.
16 Case law on the subject of videorecordation is sparse since the taping of television pro-
grams is a relatively new enterprise. See Note, The Betamax Case. Accommodating Public Access
and Economic Incentive in Copyright Law, 31 STAN. L. REV. 243, 244 (1979); Note, Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am.: "Fair Use" Looks Different on Videotape, 66 VA. L. REv. 1005,
1005 (1980); Note, Copyright-The Home Video Recording Controversy, 81 W. VA. L. REV. 231.
233 (1979). Videotaping "refers to the use of videotape in a recorder to record television signals
using the videotape in a playback machine or a recorder equipped with the requisite playback
equipment." Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156, 1161
(W.D.N.Y. 1982).
17. For a discussion of the problems with applying the fair use doctrine to videorecording,
see infra text accompanying notes 125-33.
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eters of the fair use doctrine.' 8 The proliferation of videorecording
devices has facilitated access to programs with inherent educational
value, and the videotape has become a highly effective instructional
tool.'9 The legality of videorecording for educational purposes, how-
ever, remains unclear.2"
Recently, the District Court for the Western District of New York in
Encyclopaedia Britannica Educational Corp. v. Crooks2' held that the
highly organized and systematic videotaping of copyrighted television
films broadcast by a public television station violated the copyright
laws.22 The court rejected the argument that defendants' videotaping
was a fair use of the copyrighted films.23 Crooks is the first decision 24
18. Although videorecording for other purposes may test the scope of the fair use doctrine,
this Note is only concerned with videorecording for educational purposes.
19. Videotaping capability has been readily available to public education since the early
1960s. During the last ten years, nonprofit educational institutions have been utilizing video
taperecorders to tape television programs. Off-Air Taping For Educational Use: Hearings Before
the Subcomnm on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 150 (1979) (statement of Charles W. Adams, supervisor of
media services for Phoenix Union High School District, Phoenix, Ariz.) [hereinafter cited as Hear-
ings on Off-Air Taping for Educational Use]. See also id at 74 (statement of Howard Hitchens,
Executive Director, Association for Educational Communications and Technology).
20. The 1976 Copyright Act mentions videotaping in several limited contexts. See, e.g., 17
U.S.C. § 108(0(3) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (allowing libraries to videotape newscasts for distribu-
tion to educators and researchers); id § 118(d)(3) (allowing nonprofit institutions to videotape
certain noncommercial television broadcasts for use in face-to-face teaching activities within seven
days of the broadcast).
The Act does not, however, resolve the issue of whether videotaping of copyrighted television
programs for classroom use is an infringement. Congress intended to leave the problem to the
courts while the television industry and educators met to formulate guidelines. The House Report
states:
The problem of off-the-air taping for nonprofit classroom use of copyrighted audiovi-
sual works incorporated in radio and television broadcasts has proved too difficult to
resolve. The Committee believes that the fair use doctrine has some limited application
in this area, but it appears that the development of detailed guidelines will require a
more thorough exploration than has so far been possible of the needs and problems of a
number of different interests affected, and of the various legal problems presented.
Nothing in section 107 or elsewhere in the bill is intended to change or prejudge the law
on the point.
HousE REPORT 1476, supra note I, at 71-72, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws at
5685.
21. 542 F. Supp. 1156 (W.D.N.Y. 1982).
22. Id at 1185. Defendants were the Board of Educational Services, First Supervisory Dis-
trict, Erie County, New York [BOCES] and its individual officers and directors. BOCES provided
a videotape and film print library which circulated motion pictures on request to member schools,
23. The court also rejected defendant's first amendment defenses of free speech and right of
access to information, id at 1180-81.
24. The court actually considered the same issue four years earlier in Encyclopaedia Britan-
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to apply copyright law to videorecording for educational purposes, 25
and the case leaves many questions unanswered. Because the holding
is limited to extensive videorecording by an educational corporation,
the decision does not necessarily apply to isolated instances of teachers
videorecording for classroom uses. z6 Crooks, therefore, leaves teachers
wondering whether they might now be liable for activity that has been
previously ignored.2 7
This Note explores the legality of videorecording by teachers for
classroom uses after Crooks. Part I examines the underlying purposes
of copyright law in the context of the conflicting interests of authors
nica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 447 F. Supp. 243 (W.D.N.Y. 1978). In the first Crooks opinion,
(Crooks I), plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to restrain defendants from further videotap-
ing. The court, relying on the presumption of irreparable harm to plaintiffs, applied a stricter
standard of fair use. 447 F. Supp. at 251. The court found that defendant's extensive videotaping
substantially harmed plaintiffs' market for the films and granted the plaintiffs' motion for prelimi-
nary relief. Id at 253.
25. Courts have applied copyright law to videorecording for other purposes. See Universal
City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981) (home videotaping constitutes copy-
right infringement), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982); Walt Disney Prods. v. Alaska Television
Network, 310 F. Supp. 1073 (W.D. Wash. 1969) (commercial videotaping for profit constitutes
copyright infringement). In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp., the Ninth Circuit rejected
the defendant's fair use defense that had prevailed in the district court. 659 F.2d at 969-74. For
further discussion of the Sony rationales and their relevance to videorecording for educational
purposes, see infra notes 166-74 and accompanying text.
26. In Crooks I, the court stated that, "[tihis case does not involve an isolated instance of a
teacher copying copyrighted material for classroom use .. " 447 F. Supp. at 252.
27. Several commentators offer different explanations for the failure of film and television
companies to prosecute educators. See Halley, The Educator and the Copyright Law, 17 Copy-
RIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 24, 26 (1969) (ambiguity of the statutory language); Comment, Educa-
tion and Copyright Law, 56 VA. L. Rv. 664, 665 (1970) (television companies may be waiting for
courts first to determine the extent to which copyright protection extends to television broadcasts).
Teachers may be worried unnecessarily. Section 504 of the Copyright Act, authorizing copy-
right plaintiffs to sue for either actual or statutory damages ($10,000-$50,000), provides teachers
with a defense to liability:
The court shall remit statutory damages in any case where an infringer believed and had
reasonable grounds for believing that his or her use of the copyrighted work was a fair
use under section 107, if the infringer was: (1) an employee or an agent of a nonprofit
educational institution....
17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
In an action for damages, the burden of proving that defendant acted in bad faith would be on
the plaintiff. HousE REPORT 1476,supra note 1, at 163, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws, at 5779. Nevertheless, the "good faith" exemption applies only to remission of statutory
damages. If plaintiffs elect to sue for actual damages, teachers cannot raise the "good faith belief'
defense.
Licensing may be the fairest method of accommodating the interests of both copyright owners
and users. Nevertheless, this decision is for Congress to make, not the courts; this Note therefore
focuses solely on the judicial alternatives.
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and users. Part II examines the development of the fair use doctrine as
a method of accommodating these interests, and identifies problems in-
herent in the application of the fair use doctrine to modem technology.
The final part of this section suggests that expanding the doctrine to
accommodate technological change is consistent with a fundamental
purpose of copyright law. Finally, Part III analyzes the Crooks deci-
sion, including its relevance to teachers' videorecording, and concludes
that under certain conditions a teacher's videotaping for educational
purposes does not violate the copyright laws.
I. THE PURPOSE OF COPYRIGHT LAW
The Constitution grants Congress the power to "promote the pro-
gress of science and the useful arts, by securing for limited times to
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings
and discoveries."2 The constitutional mandate suggests that the ulti-
mate goal of copyright law is to provide the public with benefits de-
rived from the creations of the arts and sciences.29 Ensuring broad
public availability of authors' works, however, requires that authors be
adequately rewarded for their intellectual achievements. Arguably, as
their economic incentive to create is reduced, the authors' productivity
28. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, ci. 8. Actually, the traditional definition of the "progress" Con-
gress sought to promote asserts two primary goals: the encouragement of artistic and scientific
endeavor through the creation of monetary incentive, and the facilitation of broad public access to
works of aesthetic and scientific interest. Chafee, Refections on the Law of Copyright: 1, 45
COLUM. L. REV. 503, 719 (1945). Clearly, these goals are contradictory in many ways, and litiga-
tion often occurs when they are directly competing. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954);
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
Many courts have held that the ultimate goal is the benefit to the public in the development of
art, science, and industry and that protection of economic incentive is a secondary consideration.
See, e.g., Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 822 (1964). See also Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM.
L. REv. 983 (1970); Annot., 23 A.L.R. 3d 139, 168-72 (1969).
29. There is some contrary authority which suggests that the primary purpose of copyright is
to protect authors' rights in their works and to ensure that economic incentive is not impaired.
See H. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY § 7 (1944). In Mazer v. Stein,
347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954), the Supreme Court suggested that protection of the author is the ultimate
goal of copyright because "encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to
advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts."'
See also Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 659 F.2d 963, 965 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982) ("the real purpose of the copyright scheme is to encourage works
of the intellect, and this purpose is to be achieved by reliance on the economic incentive granted to
authors and inventors by the copyright scheme.").
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correspondingly diminishes, and the public is deprived of the maxi-
mum benefits of authors' intellect.30 Compensating authors for their
contribution is, therefore, a sine qua non of securing public benefits
and meeting the ultimate goal of copyright law.3 ' In most fair use deci-
sions courts must weigh the benefits and disadvantages of an unauthor-
ized use and their effect on the progress of the arts and sciences.32
The copyright laws offer courts some guidance in this task. Pursuant
to the constitutional mandate, Congress granted authors the exclusive
right to control five categories of uses of their works:33 (1) reproduc-
30. Clearly, if authors and inventors do not have limited protection and economic encourage-
ment, they may stop creating, and thus, the "program of the Useful Arts and Sciences" would
come to a halt. See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., 538 F.2d 14, 23 (2d Cir. 1976). Conse-
quently, adequate legal protection should be provided for one who submits his work to the public.
Nevertheless, "courts... must occasionally subordinate the copyright holder's interest in a max-
imum financial return to the greater public interest in the development of art, science, and indus-
try." Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822
(1964).
The Supreme Court has recognized that the statutory grant of the copyright monopoly reflects a
balance of competing claims upon the public interest:
The limited scope of the copyright holders' statutory monopoly. . . reflects a balance of
competing claims.... Created work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private
motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of
literature, music, and the other arts. The immediate effect of our copyright law is to
secure a fair return for an 'author's creative labor.' But the ultimate aim is, by this incen-
tive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (emphasis added). See Wil-
liams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aft'dper curiam by an equally
divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975); REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, 87TH CONG., IST SEss., REPORT ON
THE GENERAL REvIsION OF THE COPYRIGHT LAW 5 (House Comm. Print 1961).
The priority of the commonwealth may justify the copying of an author's copyrighted work,
notwithstanding injury to the economic incentive. This proposition has important ramifications
for arguments subsequently presented in this Note. See infra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
For further discussion of the competing interests underlying copyright law, see J. MARKE,
COPYRIGHT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 16 (1967); Esezobor, Concepts in Copyright Protection,
23 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 258, 263 (1976); Gorman, Copyright Protectionfor the Collection and
Representation of Facts, 76 HARV. L. REv. 1569, 1571 (1963); Rosenfield, The Constitutional Di-
mension of "Fair Use" In Copyright Law, 50 NOTRE DAME LAw. 790, 801 (1975).
31. The amount of compensation required to maintain authors' economic incentive is uncer-
tain. Arguably, reducing remuneration to a level that still yields substantial economic gain is
justifiable. See infra notes 196-98 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 55-68 and accompanying text.
33. Section 106 of the Copyright Act grants exclusive rights in copyrighted works as follows:
Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
Washington University Open Scholarship
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tion;34  (2) adaptation;35  (3) publication;36 (4) performance;37 and
(5) display.38 The present Act, however, also carves out exceptions to
these exclusive rights and allows the public to use copyrighted works
for the above purposes under certain conditions.3 9 Because the former
Act did not provide similar exemptions, courts were left with the diffi-
cult task of interpreting language that, on its face, gave copyright own-
ers absolute control over subsequent uses of their works.40 Giving the
copyright owner an absolute monopoly over subsequent uses of their
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale
or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, or choreographic works, pantomimes,
and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work pub-
licly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, or choreographic works, pantomimes
and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
34. Id § 106(1). As mentioned above, supra note 8, this Note focuses specifically on "copy-
ing," that is, the reproduction of copyrighted works.
The right "'to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies and phonorecords' means the right to
produce a material object in which the work is duplicated, transcribed, imitated, or simulated in a
fixed form from which it can be 'perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either di-
rectly or with the aid of a machine or device.'" HousE REPORT 1476, supra note 1, at 61, reprinted
in 1976 U.S. CODE CONO. & AD. NEWS, at 5675. Videotaping a copyrighted television program
obviously constitutes a reproduction.
"[U]nder the present law, a copyrighted work would be infringed by reproducing it in whole or
in any substantial part .. " Id Of course, the sanction is limited by the fair use doctrine and
statutory exemptions. See infra note 38.
35. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
36. Id § 106(3).
37. Id § 106(4).
38. Id § 106(5).
39. Section 106 is subject to sections 107 to 118 and must be read in conjunction with those
provisions. See HousE REPORT 1476, supra note 1, at 61, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws, at 5674.
With respect to reproducing the copyrighted work, sections 107 to 118 limit authors' exclusive
rights, 17 U.S.C. (1976 & Supp. V 1981): § 107 (reproduction for purposes such as criticism, com-
ment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research may not infringe the copyright if court
determines the reproduction to be a fair use); id § 108(a) (single-copy reproduction by libraries
and archives not a copyright infringement under certain conditions); id § 112(a) (single-copy re-
production by licensed transmitting organization, that is, radio stations, not a copyright infringe-
ment under certain conditions); id § 114 (reproduction of sound recording for limited purposes
not a copyright infringement); id § 117 (reproduction of computer programs not an infringement
under certain conditions).
40. The former Act, codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1970), exempted only licensed reproduc-
tions and some noncommercial public performances. Id § 1.
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works would unduly restrict the dissemination and use of copyrighted
works, defeating the ultimate purpose of copyright law.4 ' Courts,
therefore, have limited the scope of the statutory monopoly to the ex-
tent necessary to guarantee public access to copyrighted works.42 In
restricting the scope of copyright owners' exclusive rights, courts histor-
ically have used a test to determine which "infringing uses"4 3 of copy-
righted works do not violate the copyright laws. This test is known as
41. Congress appears to have limited the exclusive rights granted to authors and inventors by
the Constitution, see supra note 39 and accompanying text, to enhance public access to their
works. See HOUSE REPORT 1476, supra note I, at 47, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS, at 5660.
42. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975) (owner's per-
formance rights do not embrace radio transmission in public restaurant); Teleprompter Corp. v.
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974) (owner's performance rights do not encom-
pass cable television broadcasts).
When interpreting statutes, courts look to the plain meaning of the language. Nevertheless.
courts must construe the terms to effect the intent of Congress. Therefore, when the statutory
language is apparently inconsistent with its underlying legislative purpose, courts must "'look
beyond the words to the purpose of the act' to avoid an unreasonable result 'plainly at variance
with the policy of the legislation as a whole."' United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns., 310
U.S. 534, 543 (1940).
43. In the past, it was unclear whether fair use was an excused infringement or not an in-
fringement at all. See Fried, Fair Use and the New Act, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 497, 497 n.4
(1977). Compare Holdredge v. Knight Publishing Corp., 214 F. Supp. 921, 924 (S.D. Cal. 1961)
(fair use is an excused "technical infringement") with Eisenschiml v. Fawcett Publications, Inc..
246 F.2d 598, 604 (7th Cir.) (fair use is a "non-infringing use"), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957).
One commentator suggests that the distinction between "fair use" and an "excused infringement"
"is of no practical significance." Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of Copyright, reprinted in COPYRIGHT
AND RELATED Topics 59 (1964). Nevertheless, a finding of fair use may depend on distinguishing
the two rationales. Courts that treat a fair use as no infringement are more likely to demand strict
proof of economic harm to the plaintiff, see, e.g., American Int'l Pictures, Inc. v. Foreman, 400 F.
Supp. 928, 933 (S.D. Ala. 1975) (plaintiff bears the burden of proving economic harm). while
courts that treat fair use as an excused infringement are more likely to forego resort to evidence in
their consideration of the economic factor, see, e.g., Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys.,
Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165, 184 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (copyright owner need show neither damage nor
reduced demand for the copyrighted work; yet, competition is a factor to be considered in deter-
mining fair use), aft'dsub nom. Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), a 'dper curiam
bti an equally divided court sub nonL Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43
(1958).
The distinction between "excused infringement" and "no infringement" was settled by the 1976
Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) states that "fair use. . . is not an infringe-
ment of copyright." Nevertheless, the notion that the plaintiff must bear the burden of proving
economic harm has been harshly criticized. See M. NIMMER,supra note 12, at § 13-84; Comment,
The United States Court of Claims on Copyright.- Williams & Wilkins Company v. United States in
Perspective, 26 MERCER L. REv. 1401, 1409 (1975); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 659
F.2d 963, 973-74 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982).
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the doctrine of "fair use."44
Described as an "equitable rule of reason, ' 45 fair use has been de-
flned 4 as "a privilege in others than the owner of a copyright to use the
material in a reasonable manner without his consent notwithstanding
the monopoly granted to the owner by the copyright. '47  "Fair use" is
now a statutory defense,4 but the doctrine was first enunciated and
developed by the federal courts. Though by no means a panacea,49
"fair use" has proven a satisfactory means to balance the competing
interests of owners and users.5
44. The first decision to actually use the words "fair use" was Lawrence v. Dana, 15 Fed.
Cas. 26 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136).
45. Karll v. Curtis Publishing Co., 39 F. Supp. 836, 837 (E.D. Wis. 1941).
46. Actually, courts have had trouble precisely defining fair use. The doctrine has been
called "the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright," Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc.,
104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939), and "so flexible as virtually to defy definition." Time, Inc. v.
Bernard Geis Asocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The reason courts have been unable
to clearly define "fair use" may be that as an "equitable rule of reason" it is incapable of general
definition and must be applied on an ad hoc basis. See HousE REPORT 1476, supra note 1, at 65,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 5679. Moreover, a rigid formulation of "fair
use" might constrict the flexibility of the doctrine and limit its application in a rapidly changing
society. One commentator suggests that flexibility in fair use
necessarily flows from the fact that the "fair use" privilege is predicated upon good faith
and fair dealing. It serves the purpose of maintaining a proper balance between the
exclusive rights secured to authors under the Copyright Statute and the correlative right
of the public to benefit from those contributions to literature, science and the arts for
which protection is provided for authors and other creators.
Schulman, Fair Use and the Revision ofthe Copyright Act, 53 IowA L. REV. 832, 832-33 (1970).
47. Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2nd Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967) (quoting H. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROP-
ERTY § 125 (1944)).
48. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work,
including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means
specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teach-
ing (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an in-
fringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a com-
mercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.
49. See infra note 72.
50. See Encyclopaedia Brittanica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156, 1178 (W.D.N.Y.
1982) ("the fair use doctrine provides a means of balancing the exclusive rights of a copyright
holder with the public interest in dissemination of information"). Accord Meeropol v. Nizer, 560
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II. THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE
A. Theoretical Foundations
In Folsom v. Marsh," the Circuit Court for the Massachusetts Dis-
trict observed that certain unauthorized uses of copyrighted works did
not violate the copyright laws.5 2 The court suggested that an insubstan-
tial taking which did not significantly impair the value of the original
work was not a copyright infringement.5 3 Proof that the copied work
was not substantially similar to the original became a sine qua non of
post-Folsom fair use decisions.54
The outcome of most fair use decisions can best be explained in
terms of the dual purposes of copyright protection.55 Courts that based
fair use on insubstantial copying were arguably concerned with protect-
ing the author's economic incentive.5 6 Most decisions before the
F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978); Wainwright Sec. Inc. v. Wall
Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978).
51 9 Fed. Cas. 343 (D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
52, Id at 347 (dictum). The court held the defendant's copying of substantial portions of
plaintiff's biography of George Washington was an infringement of plaintiff's copyright.
53. Id
54. See Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Stonesifer, 140 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1944); Ma-
thews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73 (6th Cir. 1943). The notion that substantial
similarity negates fair use confuses the distinction between infringements and excused infringe-
ments. The threshold test for determining copyright infringement is whether the copy is substan-
tially similar to the original. Substantial takings are infringements. See supra note 12. Today,
fair use is "a defense not because of the absence of substantial similarity but rather despite the fact
that the similarity is substantial." M. NIMMER, supra note 12, at § 13-56. The degree of similarity
bears on the fair use defense, see infra notes 99-106 and accompanying text, but does not negate it
per se. See Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row. Publishers, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 686, 689 (S.D.N.Y.
1974). aft'd 500 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir. 1974):
Originally "fair use" was based on the assumption that the user might copy an insignifi-
cant portion of protected material while freely using unprotected material. The doctrine
then developed to permit more than insignificant copying of protected material where
such copying was clearly in the public interest and served the underlying purpose of the
Copyright Act.
Id (emphasis in original). But see L. SELTZER, supra note 6, at 35: "If a use is substantial it
cannot be fair use. A substantial taking is the definition of infringement. An excusing of a sub-
stantial taking must be an exemption from copyright." Professor Seltzer suggests rephrasing the
substantiality factor as the "extent of the use" to avoid confusion. Id
55. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text,
56. See, e.g., Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U.S. 674 (1878); Mathews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer-Bee
Co., 135 F.2d 73 (6th Cir. 1943); Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. 348 (D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
One explanation for allowing de minimis copying is the notion of implied consent--that in ex-
change for the grant of copyright protection, copyright owners implicitly consent to copying which
does not impair the value of the original. See Sampson & Murdock Co. v. Seaver-Redford Co.,
140 F. 539, 541 (1st Cir. 1905); Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp.
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1960's, with few exceptions, 57 applied a variant form of the early Fol-
som test: any harm to the copyright owner negated the fair use de-
fense, regardless of the public interest. Two decisions signaled a shift
in emphasis.
In Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc.,5" the Second
Circuit held that the defendant's unauthorized duplication of portions
of the plaintiff's biography of Howard Hughes did not violate the copy-
right laws. 9 The court stated that the defendant's use was a fair use
because the public had an overriding interest in reading about a promi-
nent public figure. 0 Similarly, a federal district court in Time, Inc. v.
Bernard Geis Associates, 61 held that the public's interest in the murder
of John F. Kennedy justified the defendant's unauthorized duplication
of several frames of the Zapruder film in its magazine. 2
In both cases, the dissemination of information to the general public
justified the alleged infringement 63 and resulting harm to the copyright
owners.' In terms of the incentive/access dichotomy,65 Random
302, 304 (E.D. Pa. 1938); Hearings on Off-Air Taping For Educational Use, supra note 19, at 13
(testimony of Prof. Alan Latman, Professor of Law, New York University School of Law).
57. The Henry Holt and Sampson & Murdock courts emphasized the important purpose of
protecting public interest, but only in terms of an implied consent gloss. In each of these cases, the
courts suggested that authors impliedly consent to certain copying in the interest of public bene-
fits. In Henry Holt, a finding of fair use was predicated on the insignificant appropriation. 23 F.
Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1938). Had there been substantial copying (as in Sampson & Murdock, 140 F.
539, 541 (1st Cir. 1905)), the court would have ignored the public interest and precluded fair use
because substantial copying detracted from the value of the original, and correspondingly reduced
the author's economic incentive. Thus, the early cases reveal that protection of the public interest
was important only if so doing would not harm the copyright owner.
58. 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
59. Id at 311.
60. Id
61. 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
62. Id at 144.
63. See Hearings on Off-Air Tapingfor Educational Use, supra note 19, at 15 (testimony of
Prof. Alan Latman, Professor of Law, New York University School of Law). See also Wainright
Sec.,Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1977);
Keep Thompson Governor Comm. v. Citizens for Gallen Comm., 457 F. Supp. 957 (D.N.H.
1978). But cf. Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (dissemination
of information to public is no justification for copying where defendant can demonstrate no signif-
icant public interest in the subject matter); accord Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v.
American Broadcasting Co., 621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980); Roy Export v. Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., 503 F. Supp. 1137 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Marvin Worth Prods. v. Superior Films Corp., 319 F.
Supp. 1269 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
64. The Random House court observed that plaintiffs failed to show that defendant's maga-
zine article lessened the value of plaintiff's biography. 366 F.2d at 311. Nevertheless, the court
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House and Bernard Gels Associates both support the proposition that
securing public availability of copyrighted works is the primary pur-
pose of copyright law.66 Except for early cases67 which focused exclu-
sively on economic detriment to the copyright owner, and the cases
above,68 which concentrated solely on public benefits derived from
copying, the outcome of fair use decisions has always been determined
by a balancing of various factors.69  Though other factors have had
some influence, 70 four are mentioned most often by the courts: the pur-
implied that even if Rosemont had proved damages, the public interest would still require a find-
ing of fair use. Id
65. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
66. Some commentators have read Rosemont and Geis as establishing a public interest-based
first amendment privilege to copyright infringement. See, e.g., Note, Copyright Law-One Step
Beyond Fair Use: A Direct Public Interest Qualifcation Premised on the First Amendment, 57
N.C.L. REv. 150 (1978); Note, Constitutional Limitations upon the Congressional Power to Enact
Copyright Legislation, 1972 UTAH L. Rav. 534; Comment, The First Amendment Exception to
Copyright: .4 Proposed Test, 1977 Wis. L. REv. 1158. But see Sobel, Copyright and the First
Amendment: .4 Gathering Storm, 19 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 43 (1971). Though the
Rosemont court never explicitly relied on the first amendment in its fair use decision, the language
of the opinion suggests first amendment protection: "Whether the privilege [of fair use] may
justifiably be applied to particular materials turns initially on the nature of the materials, e.g.,
whether their distribution would serve the public interest in the free dissemination of informa-
tion.... " 366 F.2d at 307. The language used in Rosemont is clearly similar to the language
used in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) to describe the first amendment: "[T]he
first amendment... [attempts] to secure the widest possible dissemination of information ......
Id at 266, quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
It is thus apparent that, at least for several courts in the Second Circuit, a finding of fair use
satisfies first amendment guarantees. One student author has described the Second Circuit analy-
sis as a "hybrid fair use doctrine in which the public interest in disseminating the copyrighted
material is the decisive factor in fair use analysis." Comment, supra, at 1173. But cf. Note, Copy-
right Infringement and the First Amendment, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 320, 331-33 (1979):
[Tihe effect of a public interest-based first amendment privilege is potentially devastating
from the standpoint of copyright protection. Everything is imbued with the public inter-
est to some degree; any privilege, therefore, would be either totally dependent on the
subjective values of the judiciary, or so broad in scope that the mere fact of infringement
would be proof of public interest.
Id at 333.
The validity of a first amendment based defense to a copyright infringement claim is beyond the
scope of this Note. For a discussion of the extent to which copyright protection conflicts with the
first amendment interest in free speech, see Goldstein, supra note 28, at 983; Nimmer, Does Copy-
right 4bridge the First 4mendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Pressz, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
1180 (1970). See also Note, Copyright and the First Amendment, 33 U. MIAMI L. REv. 207 (1978).
67. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text.
69. See M. NIMMER, supra note 12, at § 13-57; Fried, supra note 43, at 499; Schulman, supra
note 46, at 833.
70. See, e.g., Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967) (court considered whether preparation of the copyrighted
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pose of the use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the substantiality of
the copying, and the effect of the use upon the market for the original.7'
B. The Fair Use Factors
72
L The Purpose of the Use73
Courts generally reject the fair use defense when the defendant uses
materials requires some use of prior materials dealing with the same subject matter; court actually
subsumed this factor and the public interest factor under its consideration of the "nature of the
materials"). For other lists of fair use factors, see Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of Copyright, 6
COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) No. 6, 43, 53 (1955); Hearings on Off-Air Tapingfor Educational
Use, supra note 19 at 8 (testimony of Prof. Alan Latman). Cohen's "other" factors include: the
intent with which the use was made, the amount of the user's labor involved, the user's benefit,
and the relative value of the material used. Id at 53.
71. One commentator conducted a survey to determine which of the four factors most often
appeared in fair use decisions. See Hayes, Classroom "Fair Use" A4 Reevaluation, 26 BULL.
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 101, 110 n.38 (1978). The survey revealed that contrary to the prevalent opin-
ion, the most frequently mentioned factor is the substantiality of the copying. Id See Williams &
Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1352 (Ct. Cl. 1973), af'd by an equally divided Court,
420 U.S. 376 (1975).
72. In 1976, Congress codified the fair use defense. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976 & Supp, V 1981).
See supra note 47. Section 107 essentially restates the judicially-created doctrine of fair use,
including the four factors most often relied upon by the courts. HousE REPORT 1476, supra note
1, at 65-66, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, at 5679-80 ("Section 107 is intended
to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any
way."). Nevertheless, the statutory language extends beyond a mere restatement of the judicial
formulation of fair use. For example, the preamble to Section 107 apparently equates fair use
with use of the copyrighted work for any of six purposes: criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research. 17 U.S.C. § 107
(1976 & Supp. V 1981). Moreover, the legislative history includes minimum fair use guidelines for
classroom copying in nonprofit educational institutions. See HoUsE REPORT 1476, supra note 1,
at 68-71, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, at 5681-85. One commentator
characterized the congressional treatment of fair use as "nearly a total loss." See L. SELTZER,
supra note 6, at 18. Seltzer asserted that three defects exist in section 107. First, it does not define
fair use; second, failure to order the factors in terms of their priority implies that "there is no
general order of priority deriving from the copyright scheme;" and third, it "muddles the
distinction" between traditional fair use and statutory exemptions by grouping "criticism,
comment and news reporting" with "teaching, scholarship, and research." Id. at 19. Seltzer cites
concentration on educational photocopying as the primary cause of congressional failure to define
fair use clearly. Id at 21. According to Seltzer, this problem should have been resolved by
treating traditional fair use, the unauthorized use by a second author of a first author's work, see
infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text, and the reproduction of an existing work separately. Id
at 25. Seltzer arguably takes an overly restrictive view of the fair use doctrine. In his opinion, fair
use could not possibly accommodate the problems arising from modem copying devices, and
Congress should be responsible for formulating solutions. Others have suggested that fair use can
encompass the "reproduction of an existing work." See generally Fried, supra note 43.
73. Section 107(l) describes the "purpose" factor: "the purpose and character of the use,
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the copyrighted work for commercial gain.7 4 Though some courts have
held that a commercial use will not by itself preclude a finding that the
copying is reasonable,75 evidence that the copying was only for
financial gain weighs heavily in the courts' analysis.76
Courts, however, are generally more receptive to not-for-profit uses
of copyrighted materials for educational, 77 scientific,78 or historical
purposes.79 These types of uses warrant protection because they tend
to further the progress of the arts and sciences.8 0 Nevertheless, evi-
dence of a noncommercial, beneficial use does not necessarily require a
finding of fair use.8 ' The court must still weigh other factors; evidence
that the use unduly impairs the value of the original work might cause
the court to reject the fair use defense.8 2
Despite the laudable purpose of the use, one commentator suggests
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes."
17 U.S.C. § 107(l) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
74. M. NIMMER, supra note 12, at § 13-59. See Henry Holt & Co. v. Ligget & Meyers To-
bacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1938) ("An advertisement with a purely commercial purpose
. . . under no circumstances could be considered a work designed for the advancement of...
science or art").
75. See, e.g., Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1069 (2d Cir. 1977) ("the mere fact that [a
copied book] is published for commercial gain does not, standing alone deny [defendants] of the
fair use defense"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978); Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House,
Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966) (commercial motive irrelevant if public benefit may be
denved from the use), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Karll v. Curtis Publishing Co., 39 F.
Supp. 836, 837 (E.D. Wis. 1941) (commercial use irrelevant where defendant's appropriation is
insubstantial).
76. See Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, 626 F.2d 1171, 1175 (5th
Cir. 1980) ("commercial use tends to cut against a fair use defense"); M. NIMMER, supra note 12,
at § 13-61 (commercial use raises presumption that use is not "fair").
77. See, e.g., Simms v. Stanton, 75 F.6 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1896); Greenbie v. Noble, 151 F.
Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Thompson v. Gernsback, 94 F. Supp. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
78. See, e.g., Williams & Wilkins v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), a f'dby an
equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
79. Eg., Robert Stigwood Group Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1976). See gener-
ally, H. HOWELL, COPYRIGHT LAW 151-54 (A. Latman ed. 1962); M. NIMMER, supra note 12, at
§ 13-6 1; Yankwich, What is Fair Use, 22 U. Ci. L. REv. 203 (1954).
80. See Fried, supra note 43, at 500 ("[i]f copyrighted material is used in such a way that the
arts and sciences are benefited, the purposes of the copyright laws are being furthered despite the
apparent invasion of the copyright owner's 'exclusive rights' "). The author calls these types of
uses "positive uses" as opposed to "ordinary uses." Id See infra note 121.
81. Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962) (fair use rejected where teacher copied
songsheets verbatim and distributed copies to his students); MacMillan Co. v. King, 223 F. 862 (D.
Mass. 1914) (economics teacher's outline of copyrighted textbook held infringement even when
given or lent to students). See Note, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corporation of America:
"Fair Use" Looks Different on Videotape, supra note 16, at 1017.
82. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1363 (Ct. Cl. 1973), af#'dby
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that only "productive uses"8 3 of the copyrighted work are fair uses.8 4
The argument is that because fair use has traditionally involved a sec-
ond author's use of a first author's work,85 the reproduction of a work
in order to use it for its intrinsic purpose can never be a fair use. 86
2. The Nature of the Copyrighted Work
In examining the nature of the copyrighted work, courts generally
consider the type of work copied, its intended market, and the availa-
bility of the work. Informational works and works of scientific or edu-
cational value are more susceptible to fair use copying87 than are
an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (Cowen, C.J., dissenting). See generally M. NIM-
MER, supra note 12, at § 13-60.
83. See Note, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corporation of America: "Fair Use"
Looks Different on Videotape, supra note 16, at 1013 (defines "productive uses" as uses incorporat-
ing "the copyrighted material in a developmental process, that is, in creating a second work or in
carrying on research or education").
84. The productivity of the use is not a factor in the fair use analysis, but only a threshold
consideration. Id at 1014. If a court finds that the defendant has used the work for its ordinary
purpose, it need not apply the fair use analysis because the nonproductive use precludes fair use
by operation of law. Id But cf Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir.
1981) (finding home videotaping of copyrighted television programs an ordinary use, but court
considered the fair use factors), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982); Fried, supra note 43 at 500-01
(while ordinary uses do not hasten the progress of arts and sciences, courts should still weigh other
factors before rejecting the fair use defense).
85. L. SELTZER, supra note 6, at 24.
86. Id Seltzer's intrinsic purpose theory is anachronistic. Though fair use may never have
permitted the use of a copyrighted work for its ordinary purpose, contemporary public interest
arguably warrants expanding the doctrine to include such uses. Recent innovations in technology
have necessarily enlarged the scope of the public's interest in access to copyrighted materials. The
idea that the reproduction of a work for its intrinsic purpose can never be a fair use ignores both
the technological constraints of the past and the expectations of a modem society. Seltzer criti-
cizes the court in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), a'd by an
equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975), for applying fair use to photocopying. L. SELTZER,
supra note 6, at 25. He fails to consider, however, that the benefit to the arts and sciences from the
copying may justify the finding of fair use even though the copying was merely an ordinary use.
87. See, e.g., Eisenschiml v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 246 F.2d 598, 664 (7th Cir.) (courts
more receptive to unauthorized uses of educational, scientific and historical works), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 907 (1957); Greenbie v. Noble, 151 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (historical works may be
used with greater license than purely created works). Cf Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United
States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aft'dper curiam by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376
(1975) (scientific works similarly subject to fair use). "The traditional approach to fair use thus
looks to the nature of the work to see whether the work promotes learning. If it does, and the
copier's purpose is to promote learning, then courts are likely to find fair use." M. NIMMER, supra
note 12, at § 13-63. See generally Note, Copyright Infringement and The First Amendment, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 320, 326 (1979). ,
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creative works.88 The public interest in the dissemination of informa-
tion presumably justifies additional access to didactic works.89 The
public interest in disseminating purely entertaining material is not,
however, clearly discernable.9 Despite its didactic nature, if the copy-
righted work serves only a limited market, copying the work is more
difficult to justify.9 Such uses presumptively impede the viability of
those markets.92 In contrast, the copying of works intended for wide
public distribution may have only a de minimis impact on the broader
market.93
The availability of the work also weighs in the fair use analysis.94 If
88. M. NIMMER, supra note 12, at § 13-63; L. SELTZER, supra note 6, at 33-34. "If a work is
more appropriately characterized as entertainment, it is less likely that a claim of fair use will be
accepted." Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 659 F.2d 963, 972 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982).
89. See Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 145 (S.D.N.Y.
1968). See also supra notes 64 & 66 and accompanying text. But cf. Iowa State Univ. Research
Found., Inc. v. Am. Broadcasting Cos., Inc., 621 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1980) ("fair use doctrine is
not a license for corporate theft, empowering a court to ignore a copyright wherever it determines
the underlying work contains material possible of public performance"). In Iowa State the de-
fendants videotaped plaintiffs copyrighted film about Olympic wrestler Dan Gable and broadcast
portions of it over their television network. The court rejected defendants' argument that the
public interest in the dissemination of information about an important public figure justified the
unauthorized reproduction. The court declined to extend Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random
House, Inc. to encompass appropriation of plaintiff's mode of "expression" when defendants
could have used the "facts" and still disseminated the same information. 621 F.2d at 61. For
discussion of the idea/expression dichotomy, see supra note 12.
90. Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 723, 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (insufficient pub-
lic interest in Rudolph Valentino to justify defendant's broadcasting plaintiff's movie over public
television station), rey'd on other grounds, 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949
(1978).
91. For example, "textbooks and other material prepared primarily for the school markets
would be less susceptible to reproduction for classroom use than material prepared for public
distribution." M. NIMMER, supra note 12, at § 13-62.
92. Clearly, the copied work will directly compete with the original within its limited market.
See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 659 F.2d 963, 975 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted,
102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982). If the author must compete with unauthorized reproductions of his own
work, he has no incentive to continue creating.
93. But cf id (presumption of economic injury raised by unauthorized uses of works with
broad public market). This is not to say that the unauthorized use will have no effect upon the
broader market, for plaintiff may show actual damages at trial. Nevertheless, the presumption of
damages is stronger in the limited market.
94. See S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., Ist Sess., 64 (1975):
A key though not necessarily determinative factor in fair use is whether or not the work
is available to the potential user. If the work is ... unavailable for purchase through
normal channels, the user may have more justification for reproducing it than in the
ordinary case.
Washington University Open Scholarship
452 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 61:435
a copyrighted work is out of print95 or otherwise unavailable, the de-
fendant has stronger justification for using the work.96 The public in-
terest in access to the works of the arts and sciences demands that
copyrighted materials be made available to the public.97 If these works
are not made available, the public has a legitimate claim to their
access.
98
3. The Substantiality of the Copying99
The amount and substantiality '0 of the copying has always been an
important factor in determining fair use. 10 1 Generally, as the substanti-
ality of the copying increases, the likelihood of the use being fair de-
creases.' 02 Although one court has upheld the reproduction of an
95. The Senate Report, however, notes that courts must consider whether there are accessible
reproduction services which provide copies of out-of-print works. The presence of such services
detracts from defendant's justification for copying the out-of-print works. Id
96. Id
97. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), a 'd by an
equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975). One reason the court of claims held the photocopying
of medical journal articles a fair use was that older issues were unavailable from journal publish-
ers. Because the scholarly material was generally unavailable, the court expressed concern that
scientific and medical personnel would be denied access to the important knowledge which arti-
cles contained unless photocopying was permitted. Id at 1356.
98. Nimmer notes, however, that in the case of unpublished works, the availability argument
does not justify copying because it is the author's "deliberate choice" not to publish the work. M.
NIMMER, supra note 12, at § 13-63. The author's first right of publication outweighs any public
right to availability. Id
99. Section 107(3) describes the substantiality factor: "the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole." 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1976 & Supp. V
1981).
100. "Substantiality" includes both the quantitative and qualitative degree of copying. The
copying of as few as three lines from a work may be sufficient to defeat the fair use defense if those
three lines constitute a core component of the copyrighted work. See Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett
& Meyers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302, 304 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
I01. See, e.g., Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. 343, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) (fair use
was precluded where "so much [of the work) is taken that the value of the original is sensibly
diminished"). Cf. Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U.S. 674, 676 (1878) (a less than substantial reproduction
is a fair use of the author's work.) Early fair use opinions muddied the distinction between sub-
stantial similarity as a threshold infringement test, and substantiality as a fair use factor. See
supra notes 13 & 54. Nevertheless, the general rationale for disfavoring substantial copying is
equally persuasive today. The substantiality of the copying also bears on the determination of
economic harm to the copyright owner. See infra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
102. See, eg., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 480 F. Supp. 429, 454 (C.D. Cal.
1979), rev'd, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982); Wihtol v. Crow,
309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962); Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532, 536 (9th Cir. 1956), aft'dby an
equally divided Court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958); Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484, 486 (9th
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entire work, 03 verbatim or virtually complete copying usually pre-
cludes a finding of fair use."° Nevertheless, because courts are re-
quired to consider the fair use factors in concert,10 5 substantial copying
should not negate per se the fair use defense. 1° 6
Cir. 1937); Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 686, 690 (S.D.N.Y.),
af'd, 500 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir. 1974).
103. In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979), rev'd,
659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982), the district court found that
"[w]hen considered with the nature of the material and the noncommercial private use, this taking
of the whole still constitutes fair use, because there is no accompanying reduction in the market
for 'plaintiff's original work."' Id at 454. The Ninth Circuit, however, rejected the Sony district
court reasoning, stating that excessive copying "precludes a finding of fair use," even if the plain-
tiff suffers no economic harm. 659 F.2d at 973. See also Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., 131 F. Supp. 165, 184 (S.D. Cal. 1955) ("mere absence of competition or injurious effect upon
the copyrighted work will not make a use fair"), af'dsub nom. Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532
(9th Cir. 1956), afd by an equally divided Court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
In Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), a7d by an equally
divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975), the court of claims found that the public benefit derived from
photocopying scientific journals justifies reproduction of the entire article. Id at 1362-63. Prior to
the Williams & Wilkins Co. decision, courts followed the holding of a 1937 decision, stating that
there is no support for "the proposition that wholesale copying of copyrighted material can ever
be fair use." Leon v. Pacific TeL & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484, 486 (9th Cir. 1937) (defendants taking
plaintiff's alphabetical listings in telephone directory and rearranging them numerically in a dif-
ferent directory). Similarly, in Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962), the court held that
total reproduction is impermissible under the fair use doctrine, even if the copying is done to
further educational or artistic goals. See infra note 115 and accompanying text. In Williams &
Wilkins Co., which involved photocopying of copyrighted articles in their entirety, however, the
court of claims stated that the doctrine that a complete copying was never a fair use is "an over-
broad generalization, unsupported by the decisions and rejected by years of accepted practice."
487 F.2d at 1353. Moreover, the court concluded that there is no "inflexible rule excluding an
entire copyrighted work from the area of 'fair use'. Instead, the extent of the copying is one
important factor, but only one, to be taken into account, along with several others." Id
104. M. NIMMER, supra note 12, at § 13-64. See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581
F.2d 751, 757 (9th Cir. 1978) (excessive copying precludes fair use even if the other fair use factors
point to a contrary result); Public Affairs Assocs., Inc. v. Rickover, 284 F.2d 262, 272 (D.C. Cir.
1960) (fair use will not justify publication in book form of verbatim copies of author's speeches),
vacatedfor insufficient record, 369 U.S. 111 (1962); Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484,
486 (9th Cir. 1937) (no support for "the proposition that wholesale copying and publication of
copyrighted material can ever be a fair use"); Quinto v. Legal Times of Washington, Inc., 506 F.
Supp. 554, 560 (D.D.C. 1981) ("reprinting of approximately 92% of plaintiff's story precludes the
fair use defense"). Cf. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 659 F.2d 963, 973 (9th Cir.
1981) (copying entire work "weighs against a finding of fair use"), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926
(1982).
105. Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1069 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978);
Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Sup. 1156, 1179 (W.D.N.Y. 1982).
106. Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156, 1179 (W.D.N.Y.
1982) (rejecting plaintiffs argument that the "substantiality" of off-the-air taping necessarily pre-
cludes fair use). But cf Public Affairs Assocs., Inc. v. Rickover, 284 F.2d 262, 272 (D.C. Cir. 1960)
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4. Economic Effect of the Copying10 7
Many commentators treat the economic effect of the copying as the
most important factor in determining fair use. t0 8  Courts are likewise
most concerned with the possible economic detriment to the copyright
owner.' 0 9 Protecting the author's economic incentive justifies the
courts' differential treatment of this factor. If a reproduction of the
copyrighted work serves as a substitute for the original and supplants
the potential market for the work, the author's economic rewards will
necessarily decline.1 0 Any reduction in the author's remuneration for
his works correspondingly reduces his incentive to create and deprives
the public of the benefits of the arts and sciences."'
Nevertheless, an overriding public interest in increased access to
copyrighted works often justifies at least a de minimis reduction of the
author's economic incentive."12  The argument may be phrased in
terms of allocating costs. If the public benefit derived from the copying
is greater than the economic harm to the author, the author should bear
the cost of reduced economic rewards. Similarly, if the harm to the
author exceeds any possible benefits derived from the copying, the pub-
(court implied that substantial copying can never be a fair use), vacatedfor insufficient record, 369
U.S. 111 (1962).
107. Section 107(4) describes the economic effect factor: "the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work." 17 US.C. § 107(4) (1976 & Supp. V
1981).
108. See, e.g., M. NIMMER,supra note 12, at § 13-64 ("[i]f one looks to the fair use cases, if not
always to their stated rationale, this emerges as the most important, and indeed, central fair use
factor"); L. SELTZER, supra note 6, at 32 ("[the factor] of first importance [is] the factor that the
statute puts last"). But see Fried, supra note 43, at 499-501. Fried suggests that the purpose of the
use has been as decisive in fair use decisions as the economic effect of the use upon the copyright
owner. Id at 499.
109. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 659 F.2d 963, 973-74 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982); Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp.
1156, 1169-74 (W.D.N.Y. 1982); Bruzzone v. Miller Brewing Co., 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 809, 812
(N.D. Calif. 1979); Mura v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 245 F. Supp. 587, 590 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
110. M. NIMMER, supra note 12, at § 13-64 to -72; L. SELTZER, supra note 6, at 18-26.
111. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. In Williams & Wilkins, Co., the court of claims
held the benefit to medical science from photocopying medical journals and distributing them to
scientists and physicians would be lost if the photocopying were not permitted. 487 F.2d at 1353.
Cf. MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 577, 579 (2d Cir. 1981) ("[t]he less adverse effect
that an alleged infringing use has on the copyright owner's expectation of gain, the less public
benefit need be shown to justify the use").
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lic should bear the cost of limited access to the author's works.' 13
In determining whether the plaintiff has suffered economic harm
from the defendant's unauthorized use, courts consider whether the use
"tends to diminish or prejudice the potential sale of the plaintiff's
work.""' 4 This inquiry requires a comparison of the plaintiffs actual
market for the copyrighted work with a hypothetical market-the mar-
ket that would have existed had defendant not copied the work." 5 If
the plaintiff's actual market is smaller than the hypothetical market, the
plaintiff has been economically injured by the defendant's copying. 116
Plaintiffs, however, do not have to prove actual damages," 7 that is,
the precise number of sales lost because of the defendant's unauthor-
ized use. Instead, the plaintiff need only demonstrate that the probable
effect from the use will be economically harmful to him." 8 One way of
113. One commentator argues that such balancing redistributes costs implicitly fixed in the
copyright scheme itself. Because Congress enacted the copyright laws, only Congress can reallo-
cate those costs. L. SELTZER, supra note 6, at 37.
114. Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1070 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978);
Marvin Worth Prods. v. Superior Films Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1269, 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Other
courts have made similar inquiries. See, e.g., Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript
Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 96 (2d Cir. 1977) (whether the use has the intent or effect of fulfilling the
demand for the original work), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978); Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National
Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741, 747 (S.D.N.Y.) (whether the use has tended to interfere with
the marketability of the copyrighted work), af'd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980). Cf. Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 659 F.2d 963, 974 (9th Cir. 1981) (whether the "cumulative effect of
mass reproduction of copyrighted works made possible by videoreorders... tends to diminish
the potential market for plaintiff's works"), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982).
115. Fried, supra note 43, at 504.
116. Id See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 659 F.2d 963, 974 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982); Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp.
1156, 1169-74 (W.D.N.Y. 1982).
117. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 659 F.2d 963, 974 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982); M. NIMMER, supra note 12, at § 13-84. But cf. Williams & Wil-
kins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (CL Cl. 1973), aft'dby an equally divided Court, 420 U.S.
376 (1975) (plaintiff's inability to demonstrate actual damages led court to conclude that defend-
ant's use was "fair"). One commentator harshly criticized the Williams & Wilkins court for impos-
ing too great a burden on copyright plaintiffs. See M. NIMMER, supra note 12, at § 13-84.
Nimmer suggested that the court of claims confused the issues of liability and damages. In light of
the New Copyright Act, which was not effective until after the Williams & WVikins decision, Nim-
mer was apparently correct.
Section 504 gives copyright owners the choice of suing for actual or statutory damages. 17
U.S.C. § 504 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). By providing statutory damages as an alternative, Congress
recognized the difficulty of proving actual losses: "under the present law, the plaintiff in an in-
fringement suit is not obliged to submit proof of damages and profits and may choose to rely on
the provision for minimum statutory damages." HousE REPORT 1476, supra note 1, at 161, re-
printed in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, at 5777.
118. Fried, supra note 43, at 505.
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determining probable effects is by considering whether the copied work
serves the same function as the copyrighted work.119 If so, there is a
greater probability that the copyright owner will be economically
harmed. 2 ° Courts have rejected the fair use defense where the evi-
dence indicated that both the plaintiffs and defendant's works served
identical functions.' 2t By implying, however, that parity of functions
necessarily precludes fair use, courts have employed a test that uses the
existence of economic harm to decide the broader issue of fair use.1
22
119. See M. NIMMER, supra note 12, at § 13-65 to -72 ("[it] the defendant's work, though
containing substantially similar material, performs a different function than that of the plaintiff's
the defense of fair use may be invoked"). Under this "functional test" courts essentially consider
whether the copied work fulfills the same consumer need or demand as the copyrighted work. Id
E.g, Karll v. Curtis Publishing Co., 39 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Wis. 1941) (court found defendant's
unauthorized reproduction of plaintiff's songs in its magazine article a fair use because plaintiff's
songsheets were intended for singing, and defendant used the songs for literary presentation).
120. E , Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982); Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962); Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
121. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods., Inc., 479 F.
Supp. 351, 361 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (defendant's unauthorized use "does not warrant 'fair use' protec-
tion because it has the same function as [plaintiff's work] under the 'functional test' and therefore
is likely to harm the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work"). One commentator
stated that the defense of fair use is "not available [if] the defendant's work serves the same func-
tion as that of the plaintiff's." See M. NIMMER, supra note 12, at § 13-70. But cf. Rosemont
Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966) (public interest in defendant's use
warrants fair use finding notwithstanding similarity of functions), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009
(1967).
Another commentator accepted the functional test as a valid method for determining whether
the defendant's unauthorized use will have a detrimental effect upon the copyright owner. See
Fried, supra note 43, at 504. According to Fried, however, a court's finding that both the plaintiff's
and the defendant's works serve identical functions is only a finding that the unauthorized use has
a detrimental effect; the-court must still decide the broader fair use issue. Id at 509. Thereafter,
the court must review whether defendant's use was positive or ordinary. If the use is ordinary, the
court can deny the fair use defense on the basis of detrimental effect alone. If the use is positive,
the court must consider "how much the use benefits and harms the progress of the arts and sci-
ences." Id at 509 n.53. If the degree of harm (reduced economic incentive) exceeds the public
benefits (increased access), the court must reject the fair use defense. Under this type of fair use
analysis, the court accommodates the interests of both owners and users.
122. Under the functional test any harm, regardless of degree, has apparently the same bear-
ing on fair use. One commentator, however, distinguishes harm which "imperils the existence" of
an enterprise and harm which only "limits the profits of a still profitable concern":
The harm in the two cases affects the purposes of the copyright laws in differing degrees.
The harmful effects of the use in the first situation are direct and immediate--the publi-
cation ceases to exist (or will cease to exist in the foreseeable future) and useful informa-
tion is no longer being published. On the other hand, when the publication will clearly
continue to exist, the harmful effects of the use are more indirect. While they lessen the
economic incentive to write or publish in the future, the threat of immediate harm is not
present. Under any weighing test that determines the issue of fair use, the benefit needed
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Basing fair use on a test that only considers whether the copyright own-
er has been economically harmed not only ignores the importance of
the other statutory factors,'23 but also undermines the utility of the fair
use doctrine.'24
C Applying the Traditional Fair Use Doctrine to Nontraditional Uses
Recent technological innovations have spawned nontraditional125
uses of copyrighted materials. Modem duplicating devices like the
videorecorder facilitate the reproduction of copyrighted works in their
entirety. According to one commentator, however, the reproduction of
a work in its entirety can never be a fair use,' 26 and only one court has
ever deemed "fair" the verbatim reproduction of copyrighted materi-
als.'27 Strict adherence to the traditional use theory presumably would
preclude fair use in all cases involving nontraditional uses of copy-
to outweigh direct harm would have to be greater than that needed in cases where the
harmful effects are only indirect.
Fried, supra note 43, at 509 n.53.
123. If "fair use" reflects a balancing of the interests of both copyright owners and users, see
supra note 65, any test which ignores the interests of one group is inherently defective.
124. Such a formulation fails to recognize that fair use involves a balancing process. HOUSE
REPORT 1476, supra note I, at 5679.
125. Seltzer argued that fair use has always concerned the use by a second author of a first
author's work. L. SELTZER, supra note 6, at 24. See supra notes 72 & 83-86 and accompanying
text. Seltzer based his statement on the 1961 Report of the Register of Copyrights, which lists uses
traditionally deemed fair uses:
-Quotation of excerpts in a review or criticism for purposes of illustration or comment;
-Quotation of short passages in a scholarly or technical work, for illustration or clarifi-
cation of the author's observations;
-Use in a parody of some of the content of the work parodied;
-Summary of an address or article, with brief quotations, in a news report;
-Reproduction by a library of a portion of a work to replace part of a damaged copy;
-Reproduction by a teacher or student of a small part of a work to illustrate a lesson;
-Reproduction of a work in legislative or judicial proceedings or reports;
-Incidental or fortuitous reproduction, in a newsreel or broadcast, of a work located at
the scene of an event being reported.
REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPvYRoTrs, CovYIGrr LAw REVISION, HOUSE COMMITtEE ON
THE JUDIcIARY, 87TH CONG., IST SEss., 24 (Comm. Print. 1961).
126. See L. SELTZER, supra note 6, at 24. Seltzer actually stated that the reproduction of a
work for "its own sake" can never be a fair use. Id Arguably, then, the reproduction of a work
for a productive use should be a fair use, regardless of whether the work is copied in its entirety.
See Note, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp.: "Fair Use" Looks Dferent on Videotape,
supra note 16, at 1013.
127. See Willias & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aft'd by an
equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975). Seltzer criticized the Williams & Wilkins court for
relying on cases in which copyrighted works were not reproduced in their entirety, but rearranged
in some manner. L. SELTZER, supra note 6, at 25.
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righted materials notwithstanding the benefits flowing from the use. 128
Given the nature and purpose of the fair use doctrine this is an un-
palatable result.
Congress intended to make the fair use doctrine flexible.' 29 Accord-
ingly, Congress directed courts to apply the doctrine on a case-by-case
basis,' 31 without applying arbitrary rules or fixed criteria. 13 1 Congress
purposely refrained from "freezing the doctrine in the statute"'132 and
instead chose to enumerate broad fair use criteria adaptable to rapidly
changing technology.'
33
The idea that the reproduction of a copyrighted work in its entirety
can rarely be a fair use constricts the intended flexibility of fair use.
Such a myopic view of the doctrine ignores two possibilities: that the
reproduction may be used for purposes which are arguably produc-
tive,' 34 and that even if the use were not productive, the reproduction
may yet be a fair use because it furthers the progress of arts and
sciences. 135
III. A FAIR USE ARGUMENT FOR TEACHERS' VIDEORECORDING OF
COPYRIGHTED TELEVISION PROGRAMS FOR CLASSROOM USE
A. Special Role of Educational Copying
The new copyright laws reflect congressional solicitude for educa-
tional copying. The impetus for much of the 1976 revision was the
widespread reproduction of printed materials by teachers for use in
classroom lessons.' 36 The drafters attempted to reconcile copyright
128. If the entire work were reproduced, there would be no need for courts to examine coun-
tervailing public interests.
129. HousE REPORT 1476, supra note 1, at 65, 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS, at 5679, 5680.
130. Id
131. Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978).
132. HOUSE REPORT 1476, supra note 1, at 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS, at 5680.
133. Many commentators assert that Congress failed to adequately define fair use. They con-
clude that congressional failure to give courts more direction has left the doctrine attenuated to-
day. See, e.g., Hayes, Classroom Fair Use-A Reevaluation, 26 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 101
(1978).
134. Note, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corporation of America: "Fair Use" Looks
Different on Videotape, supra note 16 (some modem uses of copyrighted works, even though verba-
tim reproductions, may be fair uses).
135. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
136. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), a§'d by an equally
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owners' interest in controlling reproduction of their works with the in-
herent educational value in the classroom use of reproductions of copy-
righted materials.'37 The resulting legislation exempted previously
unauthorized uses of copyrighted materials for educational purposes
with certain limitations. 38
Congress enacted section 107 in order to provide further protection
for certain educational uses of copyrighted materials.139  The House
Report on the copyright laws includes guidelines for the fair use of
printed materials and musical works in the classroom.140 Congress also
recognized the need to establish fair use guidelines for audiovisual
materials.141 Educators and broadcast representatives met 42 to discuss
the problems arising from off-the-air taping for educational purposes,
but no guidelines resulted. The Committee concluded its report by en-
couraging all interested parties to meet again to formulate guidelines
for the fair use of copyrighted television programs. Both parties have
divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975), was probably the most significant source of inspiration for
section 108, establishing guidelines for library photocopying.
137. As early as 1967, Congress recognized a need to balance these interests:
The fullest possible use of the multitude of technical devices now available to educa-
tion should be encouraged. But, bearing in mind that the basic constitutional purpose of
granting copyright protection is the advancement of learning, the committee also recog-
nizes that a potential destruction of incentives to authorship presents a serious danger.
H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., Ist Sess., 31 (1967).
Congress, however, did not want to enact a specific exemption freeing all reproductions by
educators from copyright infringement in light of the potential damage to copyright owners who
depend on sales to educational institutions. Id at 68-69. Nevertheless, Congress recognized a
need for greater certainty and protection for teachers. Id at 69. In an effort to meet this need
Congress amended 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) to provide innocent teachers and
other nonprofit users of copyrighted materials with broad insulation against unwarranted liability
for infringement. Id at 67.
138. For a list of educational uses, see supra note 20.
139. In determining fair use, courts must consider whether the unauthorized use is for "non-
profit educational purposes." 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
140. HousE REPORT 1476, supra note I, at 68-71, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS, at 5681-85. The purpose of the guidelines is to articulate minimum standards of fair use
under section 107, not to otherwise limit uses determined to be fair by judicial decision. Id at 68.
141. The problem of off-the-air taping for non-profit classroom use of copyrighted audio-
visual works incorporated in a television broadcast has proved difficult to resolve. The
committee believes that the fair use doctrine has some limited application in this
area.... Nothing in section 107. . . is intended to change or prejudge the law on the
point.
Id at 72.
142. Between 1970 and 1975, both parties held discussions on the propriety of videorecording
in the classroom setting, and concluded that guidelines would not necessarily be helpful. NA-
TIONAL COMMISSION ON THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, PRELIMI-
NARY REPORT 19 (1976).
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since unsuccessfully attempted to reach agreement. 143
Absent legislative guidance, the resolution of the problems arising
from videotaping for classroom use remains with the courts. Recently,
a federal district court in New York applied the fair use doctrine to
educational videocopying. The court in Encyclopaedia Brittanica Edu-
cational Corp. v. Crooks'44 concluded that "systematic and highly or-
ganized" videotaping of public television educational programs
violated the copyright laws. 145 The plaintiff, Encyclopaedia Brittanica
Educational Corporation (EBEC),' 4 produced, licensed, and distrib-
uted educational materials, including films and videocassettes, to edu-
cational institutions 47 and public television stations. The defendant,
Board of Educational Services, First Supervisory District, Erie County,
New York (BOCES), was a nonprofit organization that provided edu-
cational services to schools within the Erie County District. As part of
its services, BOCES videotaped educational programs broadcast by the
local public television station 48 and distributed the videotapes upon
request to teachers within the district. 14 9 The plaintiff alleged that the
defendant's massive videotaping operation infringed its copyrights in
certain films.'50 The defendant argued that its videotaping was pro-
tected under the fair use doctrine. BOCES contended that students
143. At a conference at Airlie House, Virginia, in July 1977, under the direction of the Regis-
ter of Copyrights, educators and broadcast personnel discussed possible accommodation of copy-
right problems raised by off-air videotaping by educators. The parties examined possible licensing
alternatives including blanket licenses, per-program licenses, a tax levy on blank tapes, and com-
pulsory licensing. No definite solution was found, but the parties pledged continued efforts to
reach an agreement. Hearings on Off-Air Taping For Educational Use, supra note 19, at 75.
144. 542 F. Supp. 1156 (W.D.N.Y. 1982).
145. 1d at 1185.
146. Only two other cases have involved videorecording. In Walt Disney Prods. v. Alaska
Television Network, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 1073, 1075 (W.D. Wash. 1969), the court held that off-air
taping of television programs for subsequent commercial distribution was not a fair use and vio-
lated the copyright laws. In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982), the Ninth Circuit held that videotaping of television
programs for home viewing was not a fair use.
147. Encyclopaedia Britannica offered a licensing agreement permitting schools to videotape
Britannica films which the schools already owned. While other school districts had entered into
this agreement, defendant had not. 542 F. Supp. at 1165.
148. BOCES generally videotaped all programs broadcast by the local public television station
during the daytime hours. The entire programs were videotaped. 542 F. Supp. at 1162.
149. BOCES maintained an extensive videotape library from which teachers could choose by
catalog the films they wanted. The library contained 4,500 videotaped programs during the 1976-
77 school year. Id
150. There were 19 films involved. 542 F. Supp. at 1167.
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demanded access to programs of inherent educational value, and that
the public interest in this access would justify any harm to plaintiff-
copyright owners. 51 Even if the plaintiff were economically harmed,
defendant argued, such harm would be de minimis, allowing the plain-
tiff to still maintain a profitable business.
The Crooks court agreed that the defendant's videotaping was well-
intended and that the copied films had inherent educational value.' 52
Nevertheless, the extent and scale of the copying outweighed its bene-
fits. 1 53 The court observed that the plaintiff's market for the education-
al films was unduly hindered by the defendant's wide scale copying.
Plaintiff already offered licensing agreements and made the films avail-
able in videotape format.' 54 The special educational nature of the films
suggested that the plaintiff's market was limited; any copying, even if
only minimal, would have severe economic consequences. 155 The court
also rejected the "still profitable business" argument 156 and suggested
that although the plaintiff continued to show profits, its profits might
have been larger but for the defendant's massive copying.1 57
What impact will the Crooks decision have on individual instances
of teachers videotaping programs for subsequent classroom viewing?
The decision arguably can be limited to its specific facts. The court
recognized the importance of videotaping programs of educational
value but was understandably concerned with the extent and scale of
the copying. Nevertheless, the same court in the earlier Crooks deci-
sion 58 intimated that isolated incidents of videotaping for subsequent
151. Id
152. 542 F. Supp. at 1174.
153. "[A]lthough the purpose and character of the use here is clearly educational and non-
commercial, the massive scope of the videotape copying and the highly sophisticated methods
used by the defendant... cannot be deemed reasonable even under the most favorable light of
fair use for non-profit educational purposes." Id at 1175.
154. The existence of licensing arrangements weakened defendant's "availability" argument.
In Williams & Wilkins, defendants successfully defended their massive copying of scientific jour-
nal articles because the journal articles were otherwise unavailable. See 487 F.2d at 1356-57. In
Crooks, however, defendants could have purchased videotapes of the films directly from the
plaintiffs.
155. 542 F Supp. at 1169-73.
156. See infra note 196 and accompanying text.
157. 542 F. Supp. at 1173. Nimmer suggested that the focus of the economic harm factor
should be on the potential market for plaintitl's works; this focus would require courts to consider
what plaintifis market would have constituted had defendants not distributed the copied works.
See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. In 1978, plaintiffs sought and were granted a
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classroom viewing might be a fair use.1 59 Moreover, the plaintiffs in
Crooks were film distributors, and the films were specifically produced
for and distributed to educational institutions. The question remains
whether the rationale of the Crooks court can extend to videotaping of
commercial television programs broadcast by the major television net-
works for broad public dissemination. In contrast to the copying of
programs intended for dissemination in a narrow market, the copying
of major television network programs, though still of educational
value, would engender less harm to the prospective plaintiffs, the com-
merical television industry. The Crooks decision, therefore, should not
control beyond its specific facts. While the court's reasoning offers
some guidance, fair use analysis should determine whether isolated in-
stances of videotaping television programs for classroom viewing is a
fair use.
L Productive Use or Use for Intrinsic Purpose
The threshold question of any fair use analysis is whether the alleged
infringing use is productive or is a use of the original work for its in-
trinsic purpose. 6 ° The Crooks court did not reach this threshold ques-
tion,16 however, because the scope of the defendant's copying obviated
analysis of this issue. Nevertheless, discussion of the productive
use/intrinsic purpose dichotomy is extremely important because the
resolution may determine the viability of the fair use doctrine in a
modem technological society.
Some commentators assume that fair use has always involved the
reproduction by a second author of a first author's work for incorpora-
tion in his own work and has never involved the ordinary use of the
work. 162 Under these premises, if videotaping television programs for
subsequent viewing is considered an ordinary use of the copyrighted
work, then such videotaping can never be a fair use even if subsequent
application of the four fair use factors warrants a fair use finding. To
avoid defeat at this threshold stage, defendants must prove that vide-
preliminary injunction enjoining defendants from further videotaping until the legality of the
copying was determined. 447 F. Supp. 243 (W.D.N.Y. 1978).
159. 447 F. Supp. at 252.
160. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
161. In fact, most courts do not specifically address the productive use/intrinsic purpose di-
chotomy but analyze the four use factors instead.
162. See text accompanying notes 83-86.
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otaping for educational purposes is not an ordinary use and is in some
sense a productive use,' 63 or that the traditional fair use doctrine must
now be discarded in light of overriding public interests. 164 Because the
court in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. ,165 recently found
videotaping in certain contexts a use of the copyrighted television pro-
gram for its intrinsic purpose, l66 a court must somehow distinguish this
decision in order to permit teacher videotaping.
In Sony, the Ninth Circuit held that videotaping for subsequent
home viewing was not a productive use of the copyrighted television
program. 67 A teacher's videotaping of a television program for subse-
quent classroom viewing, however, is arguably a productive and not an
ordinary use of the television program.1 68  By showing a videotape of
an educational program in the classroom, a teacher is fulfilling part of
his responsibility to educate students.169
The reasons behind taping for home viewing and taping for class-
room viewing are significantly different. Though convenience is im-
163. The productive use theory extends beyond Seltzer's intrinsic purpose theory. One com-
mentator suggests that a seemingly ordinary use of the copyrighted work might in some sense be a
productive use and thus possibly a fair use. Productive use implies that the work is used for
purposes other than those for which the work, in its original form, was intended. See Note, Uni-
versal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corporation of America. "Fair Use" Looks Dffierent on Video-
tape, supra note 16, at 1012-14.
164. Even if videotaping television programs for subsequent classroom viewing is a use of the
program for its intrinsic purpose, and thus possibly not a fair use, twentieth century technology
arguably warrants an expansion of traditional fair use. See Impact ofInformation Technology on
Copyright Law in the Use of Computerized Scientoc and Technological Information Systems,
TECHNOLOGY AND COPYRIGHT 24 (Bush & Dreyfus, eds. 1979). Consistent with the congressional
directive, courts must apply flexibly the fair use doctrine. See supra notes 129 & 130 and accom-
panying text. Perhaps, then, courts should disregard Seltzer's ordinary use theory in the case of
videotaping.
165. 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982).
166. See id at 970.
167. See supra note 166. Under the Seltzer theory, the court would not have had to consider
the fair use factors because it would have necessarily concluded that the use cannot be fair if it is
not productive. See L. SELTZER, supra note 6, at 24. Nevertheless, the court proceeded to ex-
amine each fair use factor and concluded that home videotaping was not a fair use. 659 F.2d at
972-75.
168. In a sense, a classroom viewing of the videotape of a television program is an ordinary
use, if the ordinary use of a television program is merely viewing the program. The fact that a
student views the videotape just as he would view the original broadcast, however, should not
determine whether the use is fair-, the classroom viewing serves an entirely different purpose than
home viewing. Classroom viewing serves educational purposes; the viewing of the original broad-
cast serves entertainment purposes.
169. Teaching requires access to a wide variety of materials, including television programs.
Hearings on S. 1361 Before the Subcommn On Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
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portant to both users, it is of primary importance to the home viewer'7 °
and only of ancillary importance to the teacher. Entertainment is the
major function of home videotaping, but the function of videotaping
for classroom viewing is clearly educational in nature. Students do not
view the videotape shown in the classroom merely for its entertainment
value, as they would if they were watching the program at its original
broadcast time without teacher direction. In a sense, the teacher is like
a second author. 17 1 He recognizes the educational value of a particular
television program and incorporates the videotape into his own original
work, the classroom lesson. 72 This argument is subject to attack, how-
ever, because the teacher usually incorporates the entire television pro-
gram into the daily lesson.' 73
The traditional intrinsic purpose theory, therefore, may not accom-
modate videotaping for classroom use. Indeed, reference to fair use as
"never having involved" 174 the reproduction of a work for its intrinsic
purpose, relies on late nineteenth and early twentieth century develop-
ment of the doctrine. Rigid application today of fair use principles de-
veloped during a period unaware of videotechnology immobilizes the
fair use doctrine. If courts are to apply fair use flexibly, they should
reconsider the productive use/intrinsic purpose dichotomy-or at least
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., Ist Sess., 189 (1973) (statement by Alfred Carr, Legislative
Consultant, NEA).
One educator suggests a list of five factors which distinguishes a good teacher.
(1) The good teacher takes advantage of television productions that have instructional
value in his/her classroom;
(2) The good teacher previews a given television program before using it with his/her
class;
(3) The good teacher prepared himself/herself and prepares the class in advance of the
program;
(4) The good teacher presents the program under the best psychological and environ-
mental circumstances possible. (Among other things this means that the teacher
must use the program at the time needed and not at the time scheduled by the
television station).
(5) The good teacher reshows the program in whole or in part when necessary to re-
check on areas of disagreement or to clarify issues which were not clear to students
in their initial viewing.
Hearings on Off-Air Tapingfor Educational Use, supra note 19, at 67-68 (statement by August W.
Steinhilber, Ad Hoc Committee on Copyright Law).
170. 659 F.2d at 970.
171. See L. SELTZER, supra note 6, at 24.
172. See Hearings on Off-Air Tapingfor Educational Use, supra note 19, at 75.
173. Professor Seltzer argues that reproduction of a copyrighted work in its entirety is always
use of the work for its intrinsic purpose and therefore not a fair use. See L. SELTZER, supra note 6,
at 24.
174. Id
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accord it less weight than the traditional intrinsic purpose theory sug-
gests-because the public interest in education might warrant even the
ordinary use of a copyrighted work.
Undoubtedly, videotaping for classroom viewing is a use worthy of
protection.'75 The purpose of a teacher's videotaping ostensibly is to
promote learning.'76 The nature of education and instructional meth-
ods have changed dramatically."' Today, teachers find tremendous
educational value in various methods of instruction.' If a picture is
worth a thousand words then a series of visual images must be invalua-
ble.' 79 The subleties of a carefully selected television program can
have a powerful impact upon a student and leave an impression unob-
tainable from a mere lecture on the facts of the television program.
Few would argue that the purpose behind videotaping for classroom
viewing is not laudable.
2. Nature of the Work
Most television programs broadcast by the major commercial net-
works are works of entertainment value, intended for dissemination to
a diverse viewing public. An insightful teacher, however, might see
significant educational value in programs offered solely for entertain-
ment purposes as well as in multipurpose programming.180 Although a
television program might not be considered educational at first glance,
it might have latent educational value to the discerning teacher.'
Moreover, television programs are rarely available for immediate class-
room viewing unless reproduced by a videorecorder. 82 Teachers have
175. Many courts have so noted. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 659
F.2d at 970; Encyclopaedia Brittanica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. at 1174.
176. Obviously, a teacher who owns a videorecorder can just as easily record a television
program for personal home viewing; however, the classroom presentation is strictly for educa-
tional purposes.
177. The school has become more of a concept than a place. Hearings on H..A 223 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 275 (1975) (statement of James A. Harris, President NEA). See
generally L. CHEMiN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SCHOOL (1961); D. HEATH, HUMANIZING
SCHOOLS (1971).
178. See generally W. WITTICH & C. SCHILLER, INSTRUCTIONAL TECHNOLOGY: ITS NATURE
AND USE 3-41 (5th ed. 1973).
179. See Hearings on Off-Air Taping for Educational Use, supra note 19, at 181-84.
180. See id at 152.
181. Id
182. There is currently no educational market for most programs on television. Id (testimony
of Charles W. Adams, Supervisor of Media Services for Phoenix Union High School District,
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no control over a network's broadcast schedule; many programs that
have great educational potential are aired at times when few, if any,
students can view them. 18 3  Moreover, there is little post-broadcast
market for television programs; 8 4 even if teachers could purchase tele-
vision programs for subsequent classroom viewing, the "teachable"
moment-when the program would provide the most relevant and ef-
fective supplement to the curriculum-may have passed 85 long before
the videotapes arrive. 86 Consideration of this factor suggests that the
nature of television programs, when used by teachers in the above fash-
ion, poses no bar to a finding of fair use.
3. Substantiality of the Copying
Although the teacher usually videotapes the television program in its
entirety, the substantiality of the copying should not itself preclude a
fair use defense. Though verbatim copying historically has precluded a
Phoenix, Ariz.). Moreover, the few prepared videotapes are prohibitively expensive for the aver-
age school. Id at 74 (testimony of Howard Hitchens, Executive Director, Association for Educa-
tional Communications and Technology).
183. One educator observes several impediments to students viewing the program at home:
(1) Students cannot view it at home in the evening because other family members either
want another program or do not want to watch an educational program;
(2) Many students are regularly employed and not at home when the program is aired;
(3) Extra-curricular activities, such as sports require students to participate in the
evenings.
Id at 75 (testimony of Howard Hitchens, Executive Director, Association for Educational Com-
munications and Technology).
184. See supra note 182.
185. "Usually it will be impossible for a teacher to obtain a copy of a television broadcast
from a producer for showing to students within a day or so of the airing, although that may be the
only way to take advantage of the impact of the program." Hearings on Off-Air Taping For Educa-
tional Use, supra note 19, at 68. Further, excellent programs are aired during the first semester
and the subject may be taught in the second semester. See id at 75 (testimony of Howard Hitch-
ens, Executive Director, Association for Educational Communications and Technology).
186. One factor included in the House fair use guidelines for educational copying of printed
materials was "spontaneity." See HOUSE REPORT 1476, supra note 1, at 69, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, at 5682. Congress indicated that "spontaneity" justified a teacher
making multiple copies of printed materials for classroom use. Id The Report defines "Sponta-
neity" as:
(i) The copying is at the instance and inspiration of the individual teacher and
(ii) The inspiration and decision to use the work and the moment of its use for maxi-
mum teaching effectiveness are so close in time that it would be unreasonable to expect a
timely reply to a request for permission.
Id The "spontaneity" argument similarly can be extended to accommodate the teacher's need to
do their own videotaping.
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finding of fair use'87 courts recently have suggested that verbatim copy-
ing does not necessarily defeat the fair use defense.'88 Even in the
Crooks decision, the district court rejected the plaintiffs' contention
that off-the-air videotaping constitutes such a substantial copying that
it could never fall within the fair use doctrine. 189
4. Economic Effect of the Copying
Broadcast representatives concede the good intentions of educators
and recognize the value of television programs as instructional tools.' 90
They argue, however, that absent a licensing agreement, such videotap-
ing should be disallowed because of the harm to their potential market
for the original program.' Obviously, it is impossible to prove the
actual harm to a copyright owner's market from the single showing of a
videotape to a classroom of students. 9 2 Even probable harm is difficult
to ascertain. 93 Because television companies currently have no post-
broadcast educational market for most television programs, computing
damage to the copyright plaintiff is practically impossible.' 94  One
method of proving probable economic harm, however, is by determin-
ing whether the copied work fulfills the same function or serves the
187. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
188. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd by an
equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
189. 542 F. Supp. at 1179.
190. See Hearings on Off-Air Taping For Educational Use, supra note 19, at 95 (statement of
John McGuire, Executive Secretary Screen Actors Guild).
191. See id at 39 (statement of James Popham, Assistant General Counsel, National Associa-
tion of Broadcasters). Mr. Popham concedes, however, that the market for educational uses of
broadcasts "barely exists at the present time." Id
192. The argument of broadcast representatives is based on speculation. See id
193. See Hearings on Off-Air Taping For Educational Use, supra note 19, at 150 (testimony of
Charles W. Adams, Supervisor of Media Services for Phoenix Union High School District, Phoe-
nix, Ariz.); id at 74 (testimony of Howard Hitchens, Executive Director, Association for Educa-
tional Communications and Technology); Note, The Legal Problems of Video-Cassettes andAudio-
Visual Discs, 23 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 152, 154-57 (1976). Recall, however, that Nimmer ar-
gues that copyright plaintiffs need not prove actual harm. They must only show some interference
with their market for the original; the burden then shifts to the defendant to prove that the plain-
tiff has not been significantly harmed. See M. NIMMER, supra note 12, at § 13-65 to -72.
194. The cumulative impact test applied by the Sony court is inapposite here. In Sony, the
Ninth Circuit observed that the cumulative effect of individual home videotaping of television
programs would be to severely interfere with the plaintiffs rerun market for their television shows.
659 F.2d at 972. In the educational context, however, there can be no harmful cumulative impact
of individual classroom copying when there is no educational market for the taped programs.
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same market as the copyrighted work.1 95
In one sense, the videotape viewed by students serves as a substitute
for the copyrighted television program because it replaces the students'
lost opportunity to view the program when it was originally aired. In
this sense the tape fulfills a convenience purpose. If this were the only
reason for the copying, the videotaping undoubtedly would not be a
fair use. The teacher's use of the videotape, however, goes beyond
merely replacing the students' lost viewing time. It is part of an in-
structional program designed to maximize students' learning. The re-
production, therefore, serves a different market than the original
broadcast. The intended market for the original is the home viewer;
the market for the teacher's videotape is the student viewer. The func-
tion of the original broadcast is to entertain; the function of the video-
tape is to educate. Application of this functional test demands a fair
use finding.
Assuming arguendo that subsequent student viewing of the video-
taped television program might harm the television industry, 96 such
harm is indirect197 and justified by the overriding public benefit derived
from the videotaping. One commentator distinguishes cases in which
the detrimental effect of the copying imperils the existence of an enter-
prise from cases in which the unauthorized copying merely limits the
profits of a still profitable business.1 98 Notwithstanding the minimal
impact of teacher videotaping, the television industry most likely will
thrive and prosper. It is therefore unlikely that videotaping by teachers
for later use in the classroom will reduce the television industry's eco-
nomic incentive to create television piograms. If the creator's eco-
nomic incentive is not jeopardized and the public has an interest in the
videotaping, the courts should find the use fair. Even if the economic
incentive is marginally reduced, the television industry justifiably may
have to bear this harm in light of the overriding benefit to society that
would result from videotaping for classroom use.199 Congress should
195. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
196. Admittedly, the teacher's videorecording will replace any videotape or videodisc created
by the copyright owner for distribution to, an educational market. However, this market is virtu-
ally nonexistent. See Hearings on Off-.Air Tapingfor Educational Use, supra note 19, at 65.
197. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
198. Id
199. It is important to remember that any fair use analysis involves a balancing process. See
supra note 69 and accompanying text. Therefore, it is not inimical to copyright law that the
copyright owner suffer some economic detriment, if the public benefits from the allegedly infring-
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perhaps heed the cry of television representatives and implement some
type of licensing scheme.2"° In the meantime, however, courts are re-
sponsible for applying existing law-the fair use doctrine.
CONCLUSION
Society demands two things from the copyright scheme: that copy-
right owners will receive appropriate economic rewards for their work
and that the public will have access to these works.2°0 The fair use
doctrine recognizes that certain uses unanticipated by the copyright
scheme will be fair, notwithstanding any reduction in the author's eco-
nomic incentive to create, because they further the progress of the arts
and sciences. Until Congress decides either to modify the fair use doc-
trine, exempt heretofore unauthorized uses, or compel licensing agree-
ments, courts will continue to resolve conflicts between copyright
owners and unauthorized users of their works. Balancing these inter-
ests, however, requires courts to consider that such interests are not
static; change in technology has meant that the interests of authors and
users have necessarily changed since the fair use doctrine first emerged.
Cognizant of such change, courts thus far have stretched the fair use
doctrine to accommodate unanticipated uses of copyright works. Some
commentators argue that this expansion has attenuated fair use.202 Yet
Congress has reiterated the importance of fair use as a flexible judicial
tool.203
Faced with the dilemma of destroying the force of fair use or con-
demning admittedly laudable activities such as videotaping for instruc-
tional purposes, courts are forced to decide the issue before Congress
legislates a solution. As this Note demonstrates, application of the
traditional fair use factors suggests that such videotaping is a fair use,
having first cleared the productive use/intrinsic purpose hurdle.
ing use. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. Absent a showing that a teacher's vide-
orecording of a television program for use in classroom exercises will inevitably extinguish the
economic incentive of the copyright owner, the ultimate goal of public access to copyrighted
works, to promote learning, need not yield to the interests of the copyright owner.
200. A compulsory licensing scheme was established for cable television. 17 U.S.C. § 111
(1976 & Supp. V 1981). Similar licensing schemes exist between television companies and educa-
tional institutions for distribution of public affairs broadcasts to schools. See Hearings on Off-Air
Tapingfor Educational Use, supra note 19, at 45 (statement of Joe Bellon, Columbia Broadcasting
System).
201. See supra notes 28-32 & 40-41 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 72.
203. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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Courts might be hesitant to follow the liberal fair use analysis posited
in this Note. Until Congress provides a better solution, however, an
expanded fair use doctrine can best accommodate the interests of copy-
right owners and users.
Steven H. Elizer
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